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Defendants-Respondents.*

COMES NOW Fashion Centre, Ltd., dba Fashion Gal of
Ogden, (Fashion Centre), by and through its attorney, Theodore E.
Kanell, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court and hereby moves this Court for a rehearing.
This

Petition

attached Memorandum

for

Rehearing

is

supported

by

the

including Law and Facts which Petitioner

claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended.
The undersigned counsel for Petitioner hereby certifies
that the Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
1989.

3rd

day of

April

,

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

THEODORE E. KANELL
Attorney for Fashion Centre Ltd.
dba Fashion Gal of Ogden
(Fashion Centre)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
The following Memorandum of Points and Authorities is
submitted in support of Fashion Centre's Petition for Rehearing.
ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION
Fashion Centre respectfully submits that the Supreme
Court has overlooked

or misapprehended

ci number of critical

issues in reversing and remanding this case for a new trial on a
theory of

breach of an implied term of the employment contract.

The issues are as follows:
1.

Is it appropriate for this Court to reverse and

remand this case for a new trial on the theory of breach of an
implied-in-fact term of the employment contract when Plaintiff
presented evidence on the issue, did not object to the law as
stated to the jury, and neither preserved nor raised this issue
on appeal.

In fact, Plaintiff conceded on appeal and at all

times during trial that she was "an at-will employee" terminable
at the will of either party, trying to assert a new cause of
action for "breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing".
2.
Review,"

Is

Section

appropriate

when

IV of
all

the opinion,

three

grounds

"Propriety of
raised

by

Plaintiff on appeal are denied by the majority of this Court?
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Zimmerman logically support this Court's denial of such a cause
of action.
The trial court below repeatedly informed Plaintiff's
counsel that such a cause of action was unavailable and that the
only cause of action that could be submitted to the jury would be
whether the express provisions
limited

the

employer's

of the written policy manual

ability

(Appellant's Brief, Page 29).

to

terminate

Plaintiff.

Even after the court correctly

directed the Plaintiff as to the cause of action she should
pursue, Plaintiff's counsel continued to demand a specific tort
claim

for

breach

of

"the covenant

of

good

faith

and

fair

dealing."
The Plaintiff in her brief has previously acknowledged
that the issue that went to the jury is the same issue which
this Court now determines should again go to the jury.
28 of her brief, Plaintiff states:
However, in submitting the case to the jury
on the four special interrogatories, the two
issues which Judge Hyde ruled were to go to
the jury were not preserved. The issue of
whether or not the employment personnel
policies and procedures created an express
limitation upon the at-will employment
relationship was preserved; however, the
other issue which Judge Hyde identified,
i.e.,. whether or not the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was violated at
the
time
of
discharge,
was
not
preserved
The trial court, however,
instructed Plaintiff's counsel that the trial
4

At page

court interpreted Judge Hyde's ruling
differently.
The trial court had already
determined that only one theory (whether the
express provisions of the written policy
procedures became a limitation on the
employer's ability to terminate Plaintiff)
would go the jury*
Appellant's Brief, pp.28-29 (emphasis added).
Reversing and remanding this case for a new trial on
that issue is inappropriate:
1.

Plaintiff

did

not object

to any of the jury

instructions submitted on the issue, and she did not raise the
issue in this appeal.

In fact, Plaintiff after realizing the

cause of action based upon breach of the "covenant of good faith
and fair dealing" would not be submitted to the jury, halfheartedly submitted and argued the case with respect to the
breach of an implied term of the employment contract.
2.

In her Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff totally

abandoned the claim based upon breach of an implied term of the
employment

contract

by

conceding

that

she

was

an

at-will

employee.

(See page 27 of Appellant's Brief; see, also R.449

Motion for New Trial).
Justice Zimmerman, at page

28 of the slip opinion

statedJ
Because the at-will doctrine is only a
presumption, the presumption can be rebutted
by demonstrating that the parties did not
intend the arrangement to be at will.
In

this context, the representations made by
employer in employee manuals, bulletins,
the like are legitimate sources
determining the apparent intention of
parties.

the
and
for
the

In this particular case, the at-will doctrine is more
than a mere presumption.

The Plaintiff's concession that she

was an at-will employee is determinative of the intent of the
parties.

No evidence exists which indicates that either party

intended anything other than a contract of employment terminable
at will by either party.
3.

Plaintiff further testified (R.80, Berube Depo., P.

34 t 57 and 58 and R.714) that she knew she would be terminated in
accordance with express policy when she refused to take the third
polygraph test.
this issue.

The intent of the parties was uncontradicted on

Plaintiff knew that the jury could not find for her

on the implied-in-fact exception based upon her own testimony.
In fact, the jury determined correctly that Plaintiff did not
have a cause of action for wrongful discharge on this theory.
POINT II
THE "PROPRIETY OF REVIEW REASONING PRESENTED BY THIS COURT
DOES NOT LOGICALLY FOLLOW WHEN THE MAJORITY DID NOT
ALLOW THE APPEAL ON ANY OF THE GROUNDS RAISED BY
APPELLANT.
This Court in the first paragraph of the slip opinion
correctly stated the Plaintiff's claims on cippeal as follows:
6

Plaintiff Shirley Berube claims on appeal
that the lower court erred in denying her
motion to amend her complaint to add a cause
of action based on Utah Code Annotated,
Section 34-37-16(2), in granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant Western
States Polygraph, and in refusing to allow
the jury to evaluate plaintiff's case based
upon an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
This Court opines in Section IV of the opinion:
Due to the dynamic state of this area of the
law and the questionable foundations upon
which the at-will doctrine rests, we will
examine plaintiff's arguments in the interest
of justice. Utah R.Civ.P. 51. This is an
unusual case were the plaintiff seeks to
alter the boundaries of the law. The trial
court was aware of Plaintiff's intent and
based its ruling on existing law. However,
because of plaintiff's uncommon request, we
consider it appropriate, under Rule 51, to
examine the legal issues presented.
Plaintiff's first claim as error on appeal is that the
court should have allowed a cause of action based upon Utah Code
Annotated 34-37-16(2).

This Court has determined that pursuant

to the plain language of the Code Section, no such cause of
action exists and affirmed the court below.
Plaintiff's second assignment of error concerned the
court's

granting

of

summary

judgment

in

favor of

Defendant

Western States Polygraph and Fashion Centre.

This Court in

Section

Plaintiff

III

of

the

opinion

determined

7

that

had

released the Defendants voluntarily from any claim for negligence
as pled in her Complaint.
Finally, Plaintiff presented as an assignment of error
the court's refusal to allow the jury to evaluate Plaintiff's
case based upon an implied covenant of good
dealing.

faith and fair

This cause of action, although supported by two of the

Justices, was not supported by the majority of this Court and
therefore does not survive appeal.

On its own motion, this

Court then, unilaterally, determined that Plaintiff is entitled
to

a

new

trial

on

the

sole

issue

of

whether

or

not

the

Defendants breached an implied term of the employment contract.
This theory is not a new theory under Utah law and even
though the court below tried to direct Plaintiff's counsel to
pursue actively and directly this theory, Plaintiff's counsel
elected to continue its quest for creating new law within the
state of Utah.

This Court, as long ago a thirty years, has

recognized

a

that

cause

of

action

may

exist

"if

she were

discharged without just cause depending upon the terms of the
contract, either expressed or implied...."

Held v. American

Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah.2d 106, 307 P.2d 210, 211 (1957).

The

general rule was in existence and acknowledged by Plaintiff at
the time that this case went to trial.

In the case of Bihlmaier

v. Carlson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979), this Court stated:
8

The general rule concerning personal
employment contracts is, in the absence of
some further expressed or implied stipulation
as to the duration of the employment or a
good consideration in addition to services
contracted to be rendered, the contract is no
more than an indefinite general hiring which
is terminable at the will of either party.
Bihlmaier, P. 791.
In other words, at the time of the trial of this
matter, there was no confusion as to the law on the theory of
breach of an implied term of the employment contract.

Since

this theory has been in existence for quite sometime and since
Plaintiff knew that this was the issue that would go to the jury,
(See, Page 28 and 29 of Appellant's brief), it seems unfair that
Plaintiff
appeal

should not be required to preserve the matter for

by

making

appropriate

objections

and

presenting

appropriate jury instructions, and also that she should not be
required to raise the matter on appeal after the appropriate
preservation in the Court below. King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618
(Utah 1987); E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency Inc. v. W.C. Foy &
Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).
this

theory

on

appeal

because

she

Appellant's Brief, p.27.

9

Plaintiff has not raised
has

conceded

the issue.

POINT III
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE WITH RESPECT
TO THE THEORY OF BREACH OF THE IMPLIED TERM OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT, AS THE ISSUE HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND DECIDED
IN FAVOR OF FASHION CENTRE
Justice Zimmerman repeatedly states that the facts of
this case should be construed in the light most favorable to
Berube.

It is true that in considering the three grounds which

Plaintiff presented for review, this Court should construe the
facts in the light most favorable to Berube.

The three grounds

presented on appeal concerned rulings made by the court below
with respect to alleged causes of action that were not viable
within the state of Utah.

This Court has affirmed the trial

court's decision to deny all three areas.

With respect to the

theory upon which this Court wishes to remand, this Court should
construe the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict.
E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc.,
665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983).
In this case, Plaintiff has admitted at pages 28 and
29 of her brief that the only theory that went to the jury was
"whether

the

expressed

procedures became

Plaintiff

of

the written

a limitation on the employer's

terminate Plaintiff."
that

provisions

wished

policy of
ability to

The jury after hearing all of the facts
to

present
10

on

that

issue

and

after

reviewing all of the jury instructions that the Plaintiff wished
to

submit

on that issue, and after hearing the Plaintiff's

argument on that issue, determined that there was no cause of
action under the facts.

Even though Plaintiff has not raised

this as grounds for appeal, this Court has determined that a new
trial should be granted on this ground.
must

To do so, this Court

view the facts in the light must favorable to the jury

verdict.

In the matter of the Estate of Alice Kesler, deceased.

First Interstate Bank of Utah v. David 0. Kesler, 702 P.2d 86
(Utah 1985).

If this Court were to review the record and the

facts presented in this case, including the fact that Plaintiff
has conceded that she was an at-will employee

(R.449), that

Plaintiff knew she would be terminated for refusing to take the
third polygraph test (R.80, R.714), that Fashion Centre was of
the understanding that she had failed the first polygraph test
(Ex 12 P. R.905-907), that Fashion Centre was informed that Ms.
Berube had falsified company documents pursuant to her admissions
during the second polygraph test (R.927), that Shirley Berube
herself felt that she had no expectation of continued employment
(Appellant's Brief), this Court could easily determine that there
was substantial evidence on the record to support the jury's
finding dismissing Plaintiff's cause of action.
correctly stated that:
11

This Court has

An implied-in-fact promise cannot, of
course, contradict a written contract
term.... Nevertheless, the determination of
whether sufficient indicia of an implied-infact promise exists is a question of fact for
the jury, with the burden of proof residing
upon the plaintiff-employee.
Slip opinion, Page 16.
In

this

particular

case, the

jury

found

that the

Plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proof and therefore
dismissed her Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submitted an appeal based upon three grounds.
All three grounds have been denied by this Court.

The Court has

determined unilaterally that Plaintiff should be entitled to a
new trial based upon the theory of breach of implied-in-fact term
of the employment contract.

This would require a new jury to

determine

the

whether

or

not

parties

intended

for

the

arrangement to be at-will or whether there was an express or
implied limitation on the at-will doctrine. Since the Plaintiff
has conceded that she was an employee at-will and has further
acknowledged that she knew she would be terminated by refusing to
take the third polygraph test, it would be inappropriate to allow
a new trial on that issue.
Fashion Centre hereby respectfully requests the Court
to rehear this case pursuant to the issues presented above and
12

determine that the case in Its present posture, with the record
as

mi l present. 1 y H X I il

.i . fiiHKei v eel a i i i pr esei ited • :)i 1 appeal by-

Plaintiff should not be remanded for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd_ day of

April

1989.
HANSON', EPPERSON & SMITH

THEODORE E. KANELL
Attorney for Fashion Centre I I
dba Fashion Gal of Ogden
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